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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF MR. FARBER
AND MR. MONAHAN
QUESTION, MR. KING: My question concerns Bush versus Gore,
where a five to four U.S. Supreme Court decision overruled the Florida
authorities, but at the same time, you said that Justice Thomas had moved
toward decentralization. Do you have any problem in rationalizing his
decision in the Bush versus Gore case with what you described as his
following Professor Epstein's approach towards decentralization?
ANSWER, MR. FARBER: Do I have trouble rationalizing the decision
Bush versus Gore? The answer is yes. I find the decision very difficult to
reconcile with the general trends in the U.S. Supreme Court doctrine. It
seems to me to be an aberration to use the most polite term.
COMMENT, MR. ROBINSON: I disagree with you in one very narrow
area Mr. Monahan. You made a comment about provinces agreeing to
cooperate on changing their laws after the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). I must disagree. I think that what happened was
exactly the opposite. The provinces were invited to agree during the twoyear period under NAFTA, where they could agree to change their laws. The
feds tried desperately to embarrass the provinces for not doing so. The
provinces finally gave a blanket refusal to change any of their laws and opted
out of all noncompliance laws. The feds said, "You cannot do that. You have
to specify your laws." The provinces refused to do that. The feds had to hire
a bunch of lawyers to put together all the non-compliant laws and the book
stands six inches thick. The good news is that I think that many of these
problems will be solved in NAFTA.
For example, one of our Chapter 11 cases involves a provincial measure
where Canada is going to be found guilty of breaching Chapter 11 because of
something a province did. Canada is going to immediately debit the
province's transfer account for the full amount. The province is going to sue
and we are going to get the Labor Conventions case reversed. I do not think
there is any doubt that the Supreme Court in Canada would pitch the labor
conventions out. We will have trade and commerce power, and we would
have a watershed change in Canadian Constitution law. Comment?
COMMENT, MR. MONAHAN: In relation to the NAFTA and the
Canada/U.S. Trade Agreement, the way they were sold to the Canadian
provinces was by saying, "Your noncompliant laws do not have to be
changed." It was only in very specific, very limited areas in NAFTA where
the provinces actually had to change their laws, like in the area of dealing
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with liquor regulation, and it was in those specific areas that there was a
dispute. Eventually, Ontario and I believe a few other provinces, agreed they
would modify their laws to conform to the treaty. In those cases, where
existing law was non-complaint, the province agreed to deal with it. All
other non-conforming measures could be listed and therefore were deemed to
be in accordance with the requirements of the treaty.
COMMENT, MS. VERDUN: I would like to add a point of clarification
to that because I was on the negotiating team for the NAFTA, for the
investment chapter. We were very careful in how we negotiated to ensure
that existing non-conforming measures were grand fathered, and that applied
to the U.S. as well. The U.S. had exactly the same situation as Canada did,
which was, state and provincial government officials were somewhat
reluctant to go through the labor intensive exercise of listing all the
exceptions. I worked on that part of the process and provincial officials were
very much part of the team. I think the provincial officials were concerned
about NAFTA being accurate, because if it was inaccurate, it would come
back to haunt them. The U.S. had the same problem. The Mexicans did not
because they did not have a federal situation to deal with. So we were very
careful to make sure that existing non-conforming measures were grand
fathered. Where the bite was was that any future measures would have to
follow the general principals. That did not require any legislative changes.
Legislation was not really required in those areas. The provinces were not
required to change their laws.
QUESTION, MR. CHODOSH: I want to raise a broader question. One
of the things that has puzzled me is the seemingly conflicting trend towards
international integration in North America and decentralization and
devolution elsewhere. Is there an explanation to the seeming paradox that
federal governments have essentially, through the free trade regime, limited
their regulatory powers to the extent they can justify regulation within their
country by virtue of it being state regulation or provincial regulation? Do
they get to have their cake and eat it too?
ANSWER, MR. FARBER: The two related questions were: First, about
the coexistence of an increasingly strong international regime in areas like
trade with a devolution or decentralization of powers from the nation state
downward to the local and sub-national levels; and second, whether national
governments can have their cake and eat it, too, by entering into trade
agreements but then having their sub-national units continuing along very
protectionist ways.
Let me answer the second question first. On the U.S. side of things, there
is some awkwardness about getting states on board. However, I think it is
clear that Congress does have the power, if necessary, to simply step in and
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preempt state legislation. There may be some difficulties if the state has to
actually do something affirmative, but as long as the agreement only requires
the state government to step aside and deregulate or non-discriminate, I think
that the U.S. has the ultimate power. It is clumsy because of the fact it
requires a politically difficult federal intervention, but legally, it is not a
major issue.
The first question is about the coexistence of these trends towards power
moving both sub-nationally and internationally. It seems to me it is at least
plausible that they are related trends. You do not need to have as much
power in the nation state as things like the control of the economy drift away
towards international institutions and therefore, there is a greater degree of
comfort with leaving what is left of regulatory power at the more local level.
I do not know too much about Quebec but I do remember at one point
during one of these referendums, an argument being made in Quebec, which
said, "Wedo not need to be in Canada today because we have NAFTA. We
will be an open economy and able to trade with the U.S. Therefore, we do
not need to be part of Canada today. I think that kind of epitomizes the kind
of force that could lead to what some people call the hollowing out of the
nation state.
COMMENT, MR. MONAHAN: Just briefly, a comment on that point,
which I think ties back to the second part of Mr. Robinson's question, which
is what if a province is found, for example, in a Chapter 11 case brought
against a province, in which a province of provincial measure is found to
violate NAFTA and then you have to compensate and change the measure.
Mr. Robinson is suggesting that the result will be federal government will
require the province to pay for that.
I would have thought that the position would be the opposite, that the
province will take this position and say, "Look, Canada, you signed this
agreement, now this compensation has to be paid.
You pay the
compensation and not only that, you compensate us for the fact that we have
to change our law, if we do." In other words, I thought the argument would
be, "Look, this is a matter of provincial jurisdiction. It is a valid law we are
enacting within Canada." I thought the pressure would be on the federal
government to compensate the province. Otherwise, the issue would become
a federal provincial issue and the province would say, "Canada, through this
agreement is limiting these good laws that we are enacting and we want to
have on our books."
COMMENT, MR. ROBINSON: In either case, we get a retrial of Labor
Conventions, right?
COMMENT, MR. BRERETON: I want to return to Professor Monahan's
presentation. In particular, his study of the first case involving Canada based
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on Chapter 11. I think there is an important broader point we are missing
and that is the important role that the case under the agreement on internal
trade played in that particular dispute. The fact that under the agreement on
internal trade, the inter-provincial trade authority of the federal government
is constrained. After the legislation was introduced, there was a case brought
before the panel under the agreement on internal trade by Alberta and other
provinces supporting them in which Canada today was found not to be
consistent with its obligations. So'in bringing that measure, we were, in fact,
removing the regulation that was found to be inconsistent into line with our
obligations under the agreement for internal trade. There was obviously a
spill over effect into addressing the complaint that Ethyl brought into the
NAFT7A. It is an important general point that should be given a little more
profile in terms of the current situation in Canada today.
COMMENT, MR. MONAHAN: The point that was made was in the
Ethyl case, the methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT) case.
There was also a complaint brought by the Province of Alberta under internal
trade, and that was a key factor in that ultimate resolution. The point
remains, however, that the reason why that complaint was brought or was
able to be brought was because the Federal Parliament was forced to regulate
the inter-provincial movement of the product as opposed to the real object,
which was to prevent the addition or blending of MMT into gasoline.
The objective of that case was to establish that the Parliament of Canada
did not have the constitutional authority to regulate the blending of MMT in
gasoline. The only thing the Parliament can do is regulate inter-provincial
movement of gasoline.
That was an odd result because if you look at the wording of the
agreement of internal trade, there is a specific exemption for environmental
measures. One would have thought that this measure would have qualified
under that exemption because the underlying objective was an environmental
concern.
However, the measure was framed as an inter-provincial measure and it
was attacked on that basis.
There are grounds for the federal
COMMENT, MR. MACH:
government to interfere with inter-provincial trade available under the
agreement but the federal measures failed on all the tests. No information
was provided concerning environmental or health justifications that they
were able to demonstrate that there was any negative effect from having the
MMT additive included in the gasoline. All these arguments were available
for the federal government to use and to make. They did not have any
legitimate evidence to substantiate those arguments. Therefore, it was seen
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as being nothing other than inter-provincial trade barrier contrary to the
agreement on internal trade.
The federal government, being one of the greatest advocates of economic
union and advancement of inter-provincial trade, could not sit back and say
we refuse to eliminate inter-provincial trade barrier. Their legislation was set
up because they could not differentiate between inter-provincial trade and
international trade, therefore coming into compliance by de-listing MMT for
inter-provincial trade. The federal government would have to de-list it for
international trade as well. That is why they had to settle.
QUESTION, MR. KING: I have two questions. First, who pays for all
these challenges brought under Chapter 11 concerning state regulations and
state activities? Second, who assumes the liability on these cases?
ANSWER, MR. FARBER: I do not know under the current legislative
scheme. It is an interesting question, the extent to which the federal
government could require the states to pay. I guess that the answer might be,
yes, that they could at least require the states to reimburse the federal
government. However, given the current interest in the Supreme Court and
state immunity, I would want to think about that.
QUESTION, MR. FARBER: To what extent are these general doctrines
of decentralization historically linked to the provinces of Quebec?
ANSWER, MR. MONAHAN: I think the link is very strong. In going
back to pre-confederation, the Quebec Act of 1774, the concept of property
and Civil Rights being subject to the prior, the French Customary Law and
the Civil Law, was reflected there and carried forward into 1867. The federal
system, many argue, would not have been configured in the way it was
except for the Province of Quebec. I think more recently what we see is that
the Province of Quebec, although failing in the referendums that they have
held to achieve sovereignty, have pushed a concept of sovereignty and of
sovereign powers within the limits that exist on the Constitution. The other
provinces have taken up that view.
You have, for example, these different agreements that treat the province
as sovereigns.
For example, we have the Social Union Framework
Agreement, which deals with the ability of the federal government to spend
money in the provincial jurisdiction. Now, Quebec refused to sign that
because they said it was too great an intrusion into their powers. The fact
that the federal government tried to get Quebec to sign that the agreement led
to greater recognition of provincial sovereignty of areas ofjurisdiction. Even
though Quebec ultimately did not sign it, the agreement that emerged
reflected that recognition. Quebec had an effect on the overall framework
and development of federalism.
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COMMENT, MR. KING: Well, I think we got off to a great start. Thank
you.

